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Abstract 
Children (N = 157) 4- to 8-years old participated 1 (single) or 4 times (repeated) in an 
interactive event. Across each condition, half were questioned a week later about the only 
or a specific occurrence of the event (Depth-first), and then about what usually happens.  
Half were prompted in the reverse order (Breadth-first).  Children with repeated 
experience who first were asked about what usually happens reported more event-related 
information overall than those asked about an occurrence first. All children used episodic 
language when describing an occurrence; however children with repeated-event 
experience used episodic language less often when describing what usually happens than 
did those with single experience. Accuracy rates did not differ between conditions. 
Implications for theories of repeated-event memory are discussed.  
 
Keywords: Repeated-event memory, source monitoring, cognitive development, 
narrative style, episodic memory 
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  When children are asked to describe autobiographical events that have happened 
multiple times, their narratives tend to include both episodic information about specific 
instances and generic details about what usually occurs (Farrar & Boyer-Pennington, 
1999).  Schank and Abelson (1977) termed these generic representations of events as 
‘scripts;’ organized and interconnected event structures that contain ‘slots’ for various 
objects and activities, and appropriate alternatives for those slots.  Scripts help people 
make sense of everyday experiences and make future similar experiences predictable 
(Hudson, Fivush, & Kuebli, 1992). Even by age 3, children use script-language (e.g., 
“you do X”) and recount temporally organized sequences of causally related events 
(although they report fewer script components than do older children with similar 
amounts of experience) (Hudson & Nelson, 1986; Nelson & Gruendel, 1981). Building 
scripts is an important component of young children’s cognitive development, and is 
often evident in their pretend play talk, such as ‘playing school,’ and ‘mealtimes’ (Nelson 
& Gruendel, 1979), as well as reports of less pleasant experiences such as child 
maltreatment (Schneider, Price, Roberts, & Hedrick, in press). 
Nevertheless, young children have been shown to provide episodic information 
when directly asked, but how they switch between script and episodic representations 
remains unclear.  Fivush, Hudson, and Nelson (1984) asked 5-year old children “what 
happens when you go to a museum?” and at a later point asked some of them about one 
specific visit to a museum.  When asked about the specific visit, the children 
appropriately used episodic language (e.g., “we dug in the sandbox”) to describe their 
experiences (as opposed to generic language, e.g., “we dig”).   
There are occasions when children are required to report information specific to 
individual episodes of repeated events.  For example, teachers may need to know about 
bullying incidents and police interviewers need child victims of repeated abuse to 
describe one or two individual instances with relative precision (Guadagno, Powell & 
Wright, 2006).  Interview guidelines such as the National Institute of Child Health and 
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Human Development (NICHD) protocol recommend that interviewers secure information 
about individual incidents first, before allowing the child to speak generically (Lamb, 
Hershkowitz, Orbach, & Esplin, 2008).  The rationale for this recommendation is guided 
by the understanding that rehearsal of the generic script may weaken memory traces for 
specific instances (e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 2004).   
To our knowledge, there have been only two studies addressing the critical 
question of whether recall order (episode followed by script or vice versa) in fact does 
affect children’s reports of lab-based repeated events.  Hudson and Nelson (1986) asked 
3- and 5-year old children what “happens at dinner” (general question) and a week later, 
what “happened at dinner [yesterday]” (specific question), or vice versa.  The children 
reported significantly more acts in response to the general rather than the specific 
question.  Of relevance, children who were asked about the specific episode in week 1, 
followed by the general question in week 2, reported less information in response to the 
general question than children questioned in the reverse order.  Conversely, Fivush 
(1984) asked children “what happens” and “what happened yesterday” at Kindergarten in 
a counterbalanced order, but within the same interview, and did not find effects of recall 
order on amount of information reported.  In fact, in Fivush’s study, children had such 
impressively organized scripts that, even by the second day of Kindergarten, less than 
half of the children were able to report even one specific detail.      
Two important conclusions about children’s repeated event memory can be made 
from the findings of Hudson, Nelson, and Fivush: 1) reporting about a routinely 
experienced event in general terms is cognitively less demanding for children, and as 
such they are likely to report more information than when asked about a specific instance, 
and 2) the impact of recall order on the amount of scripted and episodic detail reported 
has yielded conflicting results.  Hudson and Nelson (1986) were unable to make 
inferences about the impact of recall order because the children’s second reports 
contained significantly fewer details (regardless of condition) and Fivush (1984)’s 
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children reported very little specific detail at all.  Further, both studies examined routine 
events for which children had strongly established scripts (Nelson’s Experiment 2 
included some less familiar events but did not test recall order).  Although Fivush (1984) 
questioned children on only the second day of Kindergarten, most of the children were 
familiar with school routines in general, and nearly half had attended daycare at the same 
school the previous year.  It is possible that highly routine events are less susceptible to 
recall order effects.     
These experiments focused more on children’s memory organization than their 
memory errors (i.e., source confusions), however, and thus children were prompted to 
describe everyday events that could not be assessed for accuracy.  Whether recall order 
has an impact on the accuracy of children’s reports of repeated events is an essential 
question for field interviewers because it is well documented that children, especially 
younger ones, confuse details that have varying alternatives across instances of repeated 
events (Powell & Thomson, 1996; Powell, Roberts, Ceci, & Hembrooke, 1999).  The 
instances (or ‘sources’) are highly similar, making accurate attributions difficult 
(Lindsay, 2002; Lindsay, Johnson & Kwon, 1991).  In the current experiment, we 
systematically tested whether recall order affects not only the amount of information 
recalled, but also where that information comes from (i.e., accuracy).     
Recalling a script first may improve accuracy because it allows children to 
generate the possible alternatives in mind, and then have a better chance of choosing the 
correct one when describing an episode.  Script theories do not tell us, however, how 
children will make a decision about which alternative is correct.  
It is also possible that recalling the script first will negatively impact accuracy if 
engaging in script recall promotes decay of incident-specific details.   Fuzzy-trace theory 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; 1993; 1998; 2004) postulates that verbatim traces comprise all 
of the surface details of a specific event, including source information. Gist traces, on the 
other hand, preserve the overall structure of the experience.  Only the verbatim trace is 
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helpful when trying to describe the incident-specific details of one occurrence of a 
repeated event, and so engaging in recall of the gist should be detrimental to the accuracy 
of episodic recall, because greater processing of the gist trace leads to weakening of 
individual verbatim traces (and this occurs more rapidly in younger children).  Thus, we 
can expect that, after a delay, children who are first asked to describe a specific 
occurrence will be more accurate in attributing instantiations (i.e., incident-specific 
details) to the correct occurrence than children who are first asked about ‘what usually 
happens’, within a single interview.   
Fuzzy-trace theory, however, does not explain how children can accurately 
attribute details to occurrences in the absence of intact verbatim traces.  The source-
monitoring framework suggests that older children can use systematic reasoning to make 
better source decisions about recalled details than will younger children (e.g., “I 
remember the jellybean badge really well, so it must have been the last day”).  See 
Johnson, Hashtroudi, and Lindsay (1993), for a review of the source-monitoring 
framework and Roberts (2002), for developmental differences in source monitoring.    
It should be stated without ambiguity, that none of the three models (script 
theories, fuzzy-trace theory and the source-monitoring framework) is comprehensive 
enough to guide predictions about children’s memories for repeated events.  Script 
theories tell us about script development and structure; Fuzzy-trace theory; the 
circumstances under which children will confuse details among occurrences; while the 
source-monitoring framework explains how children correctly reassign details to 
occurrences at retrieval, even after generic scripts have been formed or verbatim traces 
have decayed.  
The aim of the current research is to examine whether the order of engaging in 
episodic versus script recall about a repeated event affects the amount and accuracy of 
information children report.  In the current experiment, 4- and 5- and 7- and 8-year old 
children took part in one or four sessions of an interactive activity.  Children of these age 
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groups differ in their ability to make source judgments (Lindsay et al., 1991; Roberts, 
2002), and in the relative speed at which they build up functioning scripts and/or gist 
traces (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004; see Farrar & Goodman, 1992, for an explanation of the 
schema confirmation-deployment model).  Children were questioned about general 
aspects of the events as well as a specific instance (of their choosing, for children who 
participated four times), in counterbalanced order, and their reports were directly 
compared to the actual record of events.     
The control group of children with a single experience was necessary to 1) rule 
out the possibility that children with repeated experience were just mimicking the 
episodic language used by the interviewer, but instead were genuinely drawing upon 
different memory representations; 2) to determine if a script-like narrative can follow 
only one experience; and 3) for practical purposes, to determine whether generic prompts 
can falsely lead children who only participated one time to communicate repeated 
experience.  
Thus, we further explore the important but conflicting work done by Hudson and 
Nelson (1986) and Fivush (1984) by examining the effects of recall order on reports of 
repeated events within the same interview (as in Fivush), but we extend and differentiate 
this research in numerous ways.  Children engaged in a lab-based event for which they 
did not have a previous script, allowing us to demonstrate that recall order effects are 
present within the same interview, and when children may be in different stages of script 
acquisition.  We included children with only a single experience of an entirely novel 
event to show that children with repeated experiences do switch representations (at least 
to some extent).  Additionally, we examined the levels of representation children used 
when describing objects and actions from the Activities; “Item-level,” (the slot in the 
script, such as badge, puzzle) versus “Instantiation-level” (the alternatives, such as 
jellybean or feather badge, puzzles of clowns juggling or cycling), to further explore the 
extent to which children switch between script and episodic representations. We 
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permitted children with repeated experience to describe the occurrence that they 
“remembered best” when prompted for episodic information.  This was done in two 
recent repeated event studies (Brubacher, Glisic, Roberts, & Powell, 2010; Brubacher, 
Roberts & Powell, in press) and is more ecologically valid than choosing the “last time.”  
When children report specific instances of abuse in forensic interviews, they may not 
always recall what happened the “first time” or the “last time.” Their memories are often 
organized around different cues (e.g., “the time at the building site,” or “the time he gave 
me a candy bar”).  Investigators may be able to determine whether these labels uniquely 
identify one time, but may not be able to determine their temporal placement.   
Finally, and most importantly, by bringing these questions into the lab we can 
compare children’s narratives to the actual record of events to determine their accuracy of 
recall.  The literature has demonstrated that children report more information in response 
to generic (i.e., Breadth) rather than incident-specific (i.e., Depth) prompts but there 
remains a question as to whether the order of these prompts matters, and we do not know 
whether the order of questioning impacts children’s ability to accurately recall the source 
(occurrence) of specific details.   
Hypotheses 
The current research makes eight predictions concerning the effects of age group, 
event frequency and recall order on children’s reports of repeated events.   Although age 
and event frequency effects are well documented, we wanted to better understand the 
effects of recall order, and interactions among these variables. 
   
1. Older children will report more information than will younger children.   
2. Children with repeated experience will report more information than those with single 
experience.  
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3. Children who respond to Breadth prompts (asking about ‘what usually happens’) first 
will report more information than those who respond to Depth prompts (asking about 
an occurrence) first.   
Further extending findings of the current body of repeated event research, we predict that: 
4. Only children having repeated experience will report more information when given 
Breadth prompts first than Depth prompts first, and this effect will be largest for older 
children who are in later stages of schema development.   
5. If children with repeated experience are engaging different memory representations, 
and not just mimicking interviewer language, they should: 
a. Report more Instantiation-level details (e.g., jellybean badge) in the Depth 
Phase, and more Item-level details (e.g., badge) in the Breadth Phase, than the 
reverse.  Children with single experience are expected to report mostly 
instantiations.   
b. Use greater proportions of episodic language in the Depth than the Breadth 
Phase; reports from children with single experience should not differ. 
c. Give more general references (e.g., “it was always the same,” “we usually did a 
puzzle of a clown juggling”) in the Breadth than Depth phase.  Quantifying 
these details in each Phase provides an indication of the degree to which 
children are alternating between memory for generic details and memory for an 
individual occurrence.   
6. Children with repeated experience will be less accurate in attributing details to the 
correct occurrence if they respond to Breadth prompts first, due to trace interference, 
than if they respond to Depth prompts first. 




 Children were randomly assigned to participate in one 20 min session of ‘the 
Laurier Activities’ while the other half participated four times over a two week period. 
All children were questioned five to seven days later about general characteristics across 
the occurrences using Breadth prompts (e.g., “what else happens?”), and Depth prompts 
(e.g., “what else happened that time?”) were used to probe a specific occurrence. Half of 
the children in each Age Group were given the Breadth questions first followed by recall 
of a specific occurrence (Breadth-first condition); the remaining children, in reverse order 
(Depth-first condition). Therefore, the design is a 2 (Age Group: 4- and 5-year-olds, 7- 
and 8-year-olds) x 2 (Recall Order: Breadth-first, Depth-first) x 2 (Event Frequency: 
Single, Repeated) x 2 (Interview Phase: Breadth, Depth) design, the last factor within-
subjects (see Figure 1 for the design).  
Participants 
Signed parental consent forms were returned for 176 children.  The final sample 
consisted of 157 children.  Of the 19 excluded, 14 were in the repeated condition.  Of 
these, seven missed their interview, five were lost across event sessions due to time 
constraints, and two declined participation. Of the five children excluded from the single 
condition, two missed their interview, two were not proficient in English (as determined 
by their classroom teacher) and one was non-verbal.  Excluded children were roughly 
balanced across conditions and age groups.  
Seventy-seven 4- and 5-year olds (M age mos = 59.36, SD = 5.70) and 80 7- and 
8-year olds (M age mos = 96.91, SD = 7.13) recruited from eight public schools (ns 
ranged from 5 to 54, M number recruited from each school = 16.13, SD = 15.84) in a 
medium sized city, a local daycare (n = 6), and a lab-maintained database (n = 22), 
participated.  Participants at each location were balanced as much as possible across 
condition, gender, and Age Group (except the daycare).  There were 77 males and 80 
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females, balanced across Age Group, Recall Order and Event Frequency.  Most parents 
declined on the consent form to provide the ethnicity of their child.  Four of the schools 
were classified as belonging to Low socioeconomic status (SES) neighbourhoods, one 
school to Mid SES, and three schools and the daycare to High SES (Ontario Early Years, 
2005).  SES of children participating in the lab was not determined but we classified them 
as mid SES because they came from diverse neighbourhoods around the Region.  There 
were no differences in SES on any of the amount of information or accuracy variables, 
assessed by one-way ANOVAs, Fs < 1, ps = ns.  All participants were treated in 
accordance with ethical guidelines. Parents who brought children to the lab were 
compensated $15 for their time and driving expenses, and schools were compensated $50 
per participating grade.  All children received a small toy ($4).  
Materials  
The composite of props and activities presented to the children were based upon 
those used in previous research on children’s memory for repeated events (Pearse, 
Powell, & Thomson, 2003; Powell et al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 2003; Roberts & 
Powell, 2005, 2006), modelled on Powell and Thomson’s (1996) original 
‘Monash/Deakin Activities.’ The event sessions consisted of 18 target details which took 
place within the context of several activities in the following order: getting ready 
(children receive badges and something to sit on, meet a stuffed fox and friend), mild 
physical exercise, listening to a story (including using a bookmark and a utensil to write 
out the name of the story), doing a puzzle, relaxing a part of the body while listening to 
music, getting refreshed, playing a guessing/counting game, and tidying up.  While some 
of these activities may be familiar (e.g., doing a puzzle), the individual props were 
created to be novel to all of the children who participated.  The sequence of activities that 
occurred was designed specifically for the Laurier Activities such that children did not 
have pre-existing scripts for these sessions.   
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Six of the 18 details varied each time (‘Variable:’ e.g., the counting activity: 
children counted flowers, frogs, cars and tambourines, on four different days). Six details 
were the same each time (‘Fixed:’ e.g., children counted tambourines four times). The 
remaining six details varied on a High-Lo frequency schedule (‘Hi/Lo’). Hi frequency 
details were the same for three sessions, and the Lo frequency detail was the instantiation 
presented at the remaining session (e.g., juggling puzzle at sessions 1, 2, and 4; bicycle 
puzzle at session 3).  These frequency schedules were included in order to provide 
necessary variability among occurrences while still fostering script development (i.e., 
fixed details are always the same, while hi/lo and variable details change, but still contain 
slots within the event script).  Without event variability, source judgments are impossible.   
Two counterbalanced versions of the Activities were created, such that half of the 
details that were fixed in Group 1 became variable, and half became hi/lo, in Group 2, 
and so on, creating eight distinct events.  Order of event sessions was also randomized 
across the two versions.  Children were randomly assigned to one of the two 
counterbalanced versions, and children in the single-event condition were rotated so that 
event sessions were used in roughly equal amounts, but also balanced with the specific 
event sessions that the repeated group described (i.e., “time you remember best”).  A 
2(Event frequency: single, repeated) x 8(Counterbalanced version specific occurrence) 
chi square demonstrated no significant differences in the event session children were 
assigned to (single) or nominated to talk about (repeated), χ2 (7, N = 157) = 11.83, p = ns.  
There were also no differences in occurrence assigned to/nominated as a function of 
Recall Order condition for children with single χ2 (7, N = 77) = 2.04, p = ns, or repeated 
experience, χ2 (7, N = 80) = 7.02, p = ns.  There were no differences between the 
counterbalanced groups across any of the dependent variables, ts ≤ 1.11, ps = ns, Cohen’s 
ds ≤ .18, and their data are collapsed.  
Procedure  
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Children took part in the event(s) in groups ranging from 2 to 10 children, in a 
classroom at their school or daycare different from their usual classroom, and those 
children who were brought into the lab to participate completed the activities in a room at 
the university.  Four research assistants (RAs) were leaders for an approximately equal 
number of event sessions.  There were two RAs present at every event session, one 
serving as the leader and one as the assistant.  For any given group of children 
participating repeatedly, the leader and assistant RA were always the same.  
All children were interviewed in an open-ended, non-suggestive manner, five to 
seven days following their final/only session for a maximum of 30 min, in a room 
different from the one where the activities had taken place, regardless of location (school, 
lab or daycare).  The eight female interviewers were blind to which specific props the 
child had interacted with, and to the hypotheses of the study. The interview began with a 
short (approximately 3 min) rapport-building phase where the interviewer demonstrated 
an interest in the child and asked about family, friends and hobbies. The interviewer then 
introduced the Activities by saying “I heard you did the Laurier Activities. I wasn’t there 
when you did the Laurier Activities but I would like to hear all about it. Tell me 
everything you remember about the Laurier Activities from the very beginning to the 
very end.”  The Activities were always referred to as “the Laurier Activities”, at each 
event session and the interview, for all children irrespective of event frequency condition 
so as not to convey any information to the child about event frequency.  Immediately after 
a child disclosed any piece of information related to the Activities, the interviewer asked 
if the activities happened one time or more than one time. The initial prompt served only 
to ensure that children recalled the Activities, and they were not encouraged to provide a 
lengthy narrative at this point.  Half of the children in each Event Frequency condition 
were first given Breadth prompts (e.g., “Tell me what happens at the Laurier Activities”), 
followed by Depth prompts, while the other half of the children were first given Depth 
prompts (“Tell me everything that happened that time/the time you remember best”), and 
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then Breadth prompts.  Prompts in the repeated- and single-experience conditions were 
identical.  If children in the single-experience condition told the interviewer they had only 
done the activities once, this information was acknowledged, but the children were still 
encouraged to tell what they thought “usually happens” at the Activities.  Recall Order 
conditions are referred to as Breadth-first and Depth-first, while the Phases (i.e., question 
blocks) of the interview are referred to as Breadth (i.e., prompts for script information) 
and Depth (i.e., prompts for episodic information). Children were randomly assigned to 
order of recall (see Figure 1).  Children received open-ended prompts in each Phase until 
they could report no more.  
 In the Depth Phase, regardless of Recall Order, children with repeated-event 
experience were permitted to describe any occurrence of their choosing (i.e., “the time 
you remember best”). In order that the interviewer and child spoke about the same 
occurrence, interviewers assisted children in labelling the occurrence if they did not do so 
spontaneously. Labels were to uniquely identify one occurrence from the others, thus 
labels could include temporal words (e.g., the first time), or a detail that only occurred in 
one session (e.g., an alternative of a variable detail, a Lo alternative). Interviewers were 
provided with a list of the details that were unique to occurrences, but could only choose 
the detail as a label if the child mentioned it spontaneously.  Interviewers remained blind 
as to which details were present in a given occurrence; that is, they knew the child had 
read four different stories and wore four different badges, for example, but knew neither 
the associated occurrences, nor which story was presented in conjunction with which 
badge.  Labels for the child-nominated occurrence were generated as early as possible in 
the Depth phase.  
Coding 
 Children’s video- and audio-taped interviews were transcribed and sanitized. 
Coders verified that each phase of the interview was carried out in the proper order and 
that the appropriate invitations and language for each phase were used.  
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Amount of information. To examine the amount and specificity of information 
reported by all children (Hypotheses 1 – 4 and 5a), target details mentioned in each Phase 
were only counted the first time they appeared (in that Phase).  Item-level and 
Instantiation-level descriptions were recorded separately.  An item-level description 
refers to the general object or action that is present in every session (e.g., leader’s cloak, 
children’s badge, story, puzzle). An instantiation-level description refers to the specific 
alternative that is present in any given session (e.g., red cloak, jellybean badge, story 
about winter, clown juggling puzzle).  Multiple instantiations of the same detail (e.g., 
jellybean badge, button badge, feather badge) were only counted one time per phase, in 
order to keep equal the total possible target details children could report, regardless of 
frequency of participation.   
Style of reporting.  To examine the extent to which children complied with 
interviewer prompts to describe their script for the activities or a specific occurrence  
(Hypotheses 5b and 5c), language coding was carried out for both Breadth and Depth 
Phases of the interview (see Schneider et al., in press, for a similar coding procedure).  
For the interviewer, each information-requesting prompt (see Hershkowitz, Orbach, 
Lamb, Sternberg, & Horowitz, 2006) was coded as episodic or generic. Only the final 
prompt was coded, in cases where the interviewers asked more than one question in a 
conversational turn (Lamb, Sternberg, Orbach, Esplin, Stewart, & Mitchell, 2003).  
Prompts were coded as episodic if they referred to a specific event or occurrence (e.g., 
“you said you made a puzzle, tell me about the puzzle you made”, “tell me about the 
badge you got the last time”).  Prompts were coded as generic if they encouraged children 
to recall scripted/general information (e.g., “you said you do puzzles, tell me more about 
the puzzles you do”, “tell me more the badges you get”).  As interviewers were explicitly 
trained in, and given feedback on, using these types of episodic and generic prompts in 
the Depth and Breadth phases, respectively, there was very little ambiguity in coding 
interviewer language.  
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Children’s utterances (i.e., conversational turns) were first divided by coders into 
units of information; statements containing at least a subject (or subjects) and a verb (e.g., 
“I danced”).  These phrases could also contain objects, adjectives and adverbs (e.g., “and 
then she put on her red cloak quickly”), and were still only counted as one unit of 
information.  Subjects/objects involved in the same behaviour were only counted as one 
unit (e.g., “Me, L, and T put pieces on the puzzle”), but subjects/objects involved in a 
different behaviour were counted as an additional unit (e.g., “but G didn’t want to”).  We 
did not count individual details because we were not interested in comparing whether 
episodic reports were richer than generic reports, but rather how effective the interviewer 
prompts were in encouraging episodic or generic responding.  
Statements in timeless present (e.g., “there are lots of other kids there” and “you 
get badges”) were coded as generic. Statements containing past-tense language (e.g., “we 
wore a jellybean badge”) were coded as episodic (Nelson & Gruendel, 1986; Schneider et 
al., in press).  One or two word phrases that did not contain a verb or were otherwise 
ambiguous in referring to a script or episode (e.g., “flowers and cars”) were not counted.  
These were rare, however, as the invitations and cued invitations (e.g., “you said you 
counted things, tell me more about that”) used in the current study are known to elicit 
more information per prompt than are direct or option-posing questions (e.g., “what did 
you count?” “did you count frogs or flowers?”) (Lamb et al., 2008).  Digressions 
(statements unrelated to the Activities), omissions (i.e., “don’t remember”), and repetitive 
phrases were not counted.  Proportion of episodic language was calculated by dividing 
episodic language count by the total language count. Proportion of generic language was 
not calculated as it is merely the opposite of the episodic proportion.   
We also recorded each time a child explicitly referred to similarities across 
occurrences (e.g., “it was always the same,” “we usually had the story about the dog”), 
termed general references, to test Hypothesis 5c, that children would refer to more 
similarities in the Breadth than Depth Phase. Mention of differences across occurrences 
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(e.g., “we only got fans once,” “one time the story was about a boat.”), termed 
discriminatory references, were also counted.  Analyses concerning these latter 
references were exploratory, however, because it is equally plausible that children will 
refer to differences when describing their script (e.g., “we usually refresh with fans, but 
one time we got water”), as when describing a specific occurrence (e.g., “it was the only 
time we got water”).  Any episodic or generic statement, described above, could also be 
coded for a general or discriminatory reference.     
Source Accuracy.  To determine if children were more accurate about a specific 
occurrence when given Depth prompts first than those given Breadth prompts first 
(Hypothesis 6), we identified the occurrence referred to by the label for children with 
repeated-event experience.  All of the subsequent details mentioned by the child for that 
occurrence were then scored as to whether they were from the same occurrence as the 
label (accurate attributions), or intrusions from other occurrences (internal intrusion 
errors).  Details that were hi/lo and variable were recorded along with the occurrence(s) 
they were present in, so that children’s source accuracy could be scored; calculated by 
dividing number of details reported that were actually present in the occurrence being 
described, by total number reported.  This calculation was performed only on hi/lo and 
variable details because fixed details by nature could not be inaccurately attributed to an 
occurrence.  External intrusions (confabulations) were also recorded, but were very low 
and are not considered further.  
Reliability. Two coders were trained for all types of coding by the primary author 
on 10% (16) of the transcripts. After training, 15% new transcripts were coded by all 
three coders for reliability purposes. Percent agreement (number of agreements / number 
of agreements + disagreements) was used to assess reliability, and was greater than 90% 
for all codes. Kappa was not an appropriate measure of inter-rater reliability, as there was 
not a finite number of data points (i.e., all data were quantified; e.g., number of variable 
instantiations found in the child’s report, number of episodic statements counted).  
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Because each variable was counted, rather than classified, percent agreement was 
calculated on every type of variable coded (e.g., variable items, fixed instantiations, 
interviewer episodic prompts, child discriminatory references, proportion accurate source 
score for hi instantiations, and so on).  An additional eight transcripts were double-coded 
after coders had completed approximately two-thirds of the transcripts, to ensure that 
coding remained consistent. Percent agreement was at least 89% on all codes.      
Results 
As a reminder to the reader, when referring to the within-subjects Phase in which 
prompts were given, the terms Breadth Phase and Depth Phase will be used.  When 
referring to the between-subjects Recall Order of these question types, the terms Breadth-
first (i.e., Breadth questions were asked first) and Depth-first (i.e., Depth questions were 
asked first) will be used (see Figure 1).  Alpha is evaluated at p < .05, unless otherwise 
specified (e.g., in the case of correction for multiple tests).  All post hoc tests are 
Bonferroni p < .05.   
Preliminary Analyses 
No differences were found in the number of days between event and interview 
session, Fs, ≤ 2.32, ps = ns, ηp2s ≤ .015, or gender, Х2s ≤ 3.06, ps = ns, across any levels 
of the independent variables.  No differences in age in months were observed between the 
Recall Order or Event Frequency conditions, Fs, < 1, ps = ns, ηp2s < .01. Four children, 
all of whom participated one time, did not remember doing the Activities and were 
removed from subsequent analyses. Three were 5-year olds and one was an 8-year old. 
They were evenly divided across Recall Order conditions.    
As a manipulation check, we ran a paired-samples t-test on the proportion of 
episodic language used by interviewers in the Breadth and Depth Phases, to ensure that 
interviewers had used the appropriate style of language. As they were trained to do, 
interviewers used episodic language in the Depth Phase (M = .98, SD = .07) and 
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significantly less in the Breadth Phase (M = .08, SD = .15), t(148) = 67.52, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 7.72.   
Main Analyses  
Children with repeated experience most often chose the first (n = 23) or last (n = 
33) occurrence to describe, although many chose the third (n = 17), and very few chose 
the second (n = 7).  They did not differ as a function of Age Group or Recall Order in 
their choices, as assessed with chi square analyses, χ2s (3, N = 80) ≤ 3.37, ps = ns, nor as 
a function of which occurrence was chosen, on any of the dependent variables examined, 
as assessed by one-way ANOVAs, Fs ≤ 1.89, ps = ns.    
Amount of target information reported. We first tested Hypotheses 1-3, that 
older children, those responding to Breadth prompts first, and those with repeated 
experience, would report overall more information than younger children, those 
responding to Depth prompts first, and those with single experience, respectively; 
Hypothesis 4, that these effects will be most prevalent in children with repeated 
experience, and strongest for older children; and Hypothesis 5a, that Instantiation-level 
details would be reported with greater frequency in the Depth section, while Item-level 
details would be reported more often in the Breadth section, than the reverse. For the 
purpose of these analyses we collapsed across detail-type (i.e., fixed, hi/lo, variable1).  
We tallied the number of Instantiation- and Item-level details children reported in each 
phase of the interview (out of 18), and analyzed them with 2(Age Group) x 2(Recall 
Order) x 2(Event Frequency) x 2(Number of Items Reported per Phase [Items/Phase]: 
Breadth, Depth), and 2(Age Group) x 2(Recall Order) x 2(Event Frequency) x 2(Number 
of Instantiations Reported per Phase [Instantiations/Phase]: Breadth, Depth) mixed 
ANOVAs, the last factor within-subjects for both analyses.  
For the analysis concerning Items, all three between-subjects main effects were 
significant, Fs ≥ 8.24, ps ≤ .005, ηp2s ≥ .056.  As predicted, older children (M = 3.69, SD 
= 1.64), those who received Breadth prompts first (M = 3.19, SD = 1.69), and those who 
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participated repeatedly (M = 3.25, SD = 1.71), reported more details overall than younger 
children (M = 1.92, SD = 1.15), those who received Depth prompts first (M = 2.49, SD = 
1.60), and those who participated once (M = 2.34, SD = 1.51). 
  The within-subjects main effect of Items/Phase approached significance, F(1, 
139) = 3.42, p = .067, ηp2 = .024, but there was also a marginal Age Group x Items/Phase 
interaction, F(1, 139) = 3.50, p = .064, ηp2 = .025.  Two paired-samples t-tests indicated 
that younger children did not differ at all in their reporting of Items from the Breadth (M 
= 1.92, SD = 1.57) to Depth (M = 1.93, SD = 1.45) Phases, t(70) < 1, p = ns, Cohen’s d = 
.01, while more Items were reported in the Breadth (M = 4.03, SD = 2.05) than Depth 
Phase (M = 3.36, SD = 1.93) by older children t(75) = 2.62, p = .011, Cohen’s d = .34.  
No other effects were significant, Fs ≤ 1.74, ps = ns, ηp2s ≤ .012.   
For the Instantiations analysis, there were significant between-subjects main 
effects of Age Group and Event Frequency, Fs ≥ 24.54, ps < .001,ηp2s ≥ .15, and the 
within-subject main effect of Instantiations/Phase, F(1, 139) = 22.18, p < .001, ηp2 = .138.  
These were subsumed by significant two-way interactions between Age Group x Event 
Frequency, F(1, 139) = 8.65, p = .004, ηp2 = .059, and Age Group x Instantiations/Phase, 
F(1, 139) = 6.83, p = .01,  ηp2 = .047.  There was also a Recall Order x 
Instantiations/Phase interaction, F(1, 139) = 11.30, p = .001, ηp2 = .075.  No other effects 
were significant, Fs ≤ 3.42, ps = ns, ηp2s ≤ .024.   
The Age Group x Event Frequency and Age Group x Instantiations/Phase 
interactions were tested by conducting tests for the younger and older children separately.  
For the Age Group x Event Frequency interaction, an independent-samples t-test revealed 
that both younger and older children reported more instantiations when they had repeated 
experience (4- and 5-year olds M = 2.78, SD = 1.62; 7- and 8-year olds M = 7.84, SD = 
3.44) versus single (4- and 5-year olds M = 2.03, SD = 1.16; 7- and 8-year olds M = 4.86, 
SD = 2.13) experience, but the effect was larger for older children (4- and 5-year olds 
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t(68.61) = 2.24, p = .028, Cohen’s d = .53; 7- and 8-year olds t(66.00) = 4.58, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = 1.04).  
 Paired-samples t-tests exploring the Age Group x Instantiations/Phase interaction 
demonstrated that both younger and older children reported more instantiations in the 
Depth Phase (4- and 5-year olds M = 2.56, SD = 1.68; 7- and 8-year olds M = 6.96, SD = 
3.42) than in the Breadth Phase (4- and 5-year olds M = 1.83, SD = 1.55; 7- and 8-year 
olds M = 4.37, SD = 2.60) but again the effect was larger for older children (4- and 5-year 
olds t(70) = 3.03, p = .003, Cohen’s d = .45; 7- and 8-year olds t(75) = 6.53, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = .86).  
The Recall Order x Instantiations/Phase interaction was tested by conducting 
separate independent-samples t-tests for Depth- and Breadth-Phase instantiations.  
Children who responded to Breadth prompts first (M = 4.96, SD = 3.89) reported as many 
instantiations in the Depth Phase as children who responded to Depth prompts first (M = 
4.72, SD = 3.09), t(145) < 1, p = ns, Cohen’s d =.07.  In contrast, in the Breadth Phase, 
children who responded to Breadth prompts first (M = 3.63, SD = 2.61) reported more 
instantiations than children who responded to Depth prompts first (M = 2.66, SD = 2.30), 
t(145) = 2.39, p = .018, Cohen’s d = .40.   
In summary, across both analyses, older children and those with repeated 
experience reported more than younger children and those with single experience, 
respectively.  Children who received Breadth prompts first reported more Items across 
the interview than did children who received Depth prompts first, and older children 
reported more items in Breadth than Depth.  The main effect of Recall Order observed in 
the Items analysis was not present in the instantiations analysis, but rather was qualified 
by an interaction with Phase; children who responded to Breadth prompts first reported 
equally as many instantiations in the Depth Phase as children who received that Phase 
first, but they reported more instantiations in the Breadth Phase than children who 
received that Phase second.  More Instantiation-level details were provided in the Depth 
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than Breadth phase, regardless of Recall Order.  This latter finding was especially true for 
the older children with repeated-event experience.  
Style of reporting.  To test Hypothesis 5b, that children with repeated experience 
would use a greater proportion of episodic language in the Depth than Breadth Phase, a 
2(Age Group) x 2(Recall Order) x 2(Event Frequency) x 2(Phase: Breadth, Depth) mixed 
ANOVA was conducted on the episodic language proportions; Phase was within-
subjects.  The following main effects were observed: Age Group, F(1, 140) = 8.17, p = 
.005, ηp2 = .055, Event Frequency, F(1, 140) = 90.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .394, and Phase, 
F(1, 140) = 381.22, p < .001, ηp2 = .731, with more episodic language being used by 
older children and children who participated one time than younger children and those 
with repeated experience, respectively.  More episodic language was used in the Depth 
phase than the Breadth phase.  See Table 1 for all cell means.    
 There were two-way interactions between Phase x Event Frequency, F(1, 140) = 
15.85, p < .001, ηp2 = .102, and Recall Order x Event Frequency, F(1, 140) = 4.57, p = 
.034, ηp2 = .032, but these were subsumed by Phase x Age Group x Event Frequency, 
F(1, 140) = 6.68, p =.011, ηp2 = .046, and Phase x Recall Order x Event Frequency, F(1, 
140) = 9.27, p =.003, ηp2 = .062, three-way interactions.  See Figures 2 and 3, 
respectively.  Both interactions were explored by examining the Breadth and Depth 
Phases separately because different patterns in children’s language style were predicted 
in response to the generic versus episodic prompts. 
Two 2(Age Group) x 2(Event Frequency) ANOVAs were conducted (alpha = 
.025), one per Phase (Figure 2). For the Breadth Phase analysis, only a main effect of 
Event Frequency was observed, F(1, 145) = 64.03, p < .001, ηp2 = .306.  Children with 
single-event experience used more episodic language in the Breadth phase than those 
with repeated experience. For the Depth Phase analysis, both main effects and the 
interaction were significant, Fs ≥ 5.79, ps ≤ .017, ηp2s ≥ .038.  Two planned t-tests were 
conducted to compare episodic language differences by Event Frequency conditions; one 
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test for each Age Group (alpha = .025).  Analyses revealed that all children with single 
event experience used proportionally more episodic language in the Depth phase than 
children with repeated-event experience, but the difference was larger for the 4- and 5-
year olds, t(42.94) = 6.95, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.52, than the 7- and 8-year olds, 
t(44.03) = 3.97, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .92, because the younger children with repeated 
experience reported the lowest amount of episodic information.    
The Phase x Recall Order x Event Frequency interaction was analysed using two 
2(Recall Order) x 2(Event Frequency) ANOVAs (alpha = .025), for Breadth and Depth, 
respectively (Figure 3). For the Breadth Phase analysis, there was a main effect of 
Frequency, F(1, 145) = 69.84, p < .001, ηp2 = .325, and a Recall Order x Frequency 
interaction, F(1, 145) = 8.78, p =.004, ηp2 = .057.  Two independent samples t-tests were 
conducted to compare episodic language differences by Recall Order; one test for each 
level of Event Frequency. Results demonstrated differences in children with single-event 
experience, t(59.68) = 2.85, p = .002, Cohen’s d = .70, but not repeated t(65.56) = 1.21, p 
= ns, Cohen’s d = .29.  Children with single experience used proportionally less episodic 
language (thus more generic language) in the Breadth Phase when this phase came 
second (i.e., Depth-first) than if it came first (i.e., Breadth-first).  Children with repeated 
experience used proportionally equivalent amounts of episodic language in the Breadth 
phase regardless of recall order.  For the Depth analysis, the only effect was of 
Frequency, F(1, 148) = 50.93, p < .001, ηp2 = .256. Children with single experience used 
proportionally more episodic language in the Depth phase than did children with repeated 
experience.  
In summary, children with repeated-event experience provided more generic 
utterances when given Breadth prompts in contrast to children with one experience, and 
older children with repeated experience were very good at responding episodically when 
asked to describe a specific occurrence.  Children with single-event experience were 
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better able to comply with Breadth prompts if they had first described the single 
occurrence they participated in, than if they were asked for generic details first.  
 General and Discriminatory References.  Children with single experience were 
excluded from this analysis, as they could not compare and contrast individual instances.  
To test the prediction that children with repeated experience would report more general 
references in the Breadth than Depth Phase (Hypothesis 5c), a 2(Age Group) x 2(Recall 
Order) x 2(General reference: Breadth-phase, Depth-phase) mixed ANOVA was 
conducted.  It demonstrated that older children made more general references overall than 
did younger children, and more general references were reported in the Breadth-phase 
than in the Depth-phase as predicted, Fs ≥ 12.02, ps ≤ .001, ηp2s ≥ .137.  Age and Phase 
interacted, F (1, 76) = 18.14, p < .001, ηp2 = .193.   Planned t-tests demonstrated that it 
was the older children who provided a greater number of general references in Breadth 
(M = 4.18, SD = 4.37) than in Depth Phases (M = 1.40, SD = 1.34), t(39) = 4.01, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = .86, in contrast to the younger children who did not differ from Breadth (M = 
.28, SD = .55) to Depth Phases (M = .55, SD = .96), t(39) = -1.76, p = ns, Cohen’s d = 
.34.   There were no main effects of recall order, nor interactions with this variable, Fs < 
1, ps = ns, ηp2s < .01.    
A 2(Age) x 2(Recall Order) x2(Discriminatory reference: Breadth-phase, Depth-
phase) mixed ANOVA demonstrated a slightly different pattern from the General 
references.  There was again a main effect of Age Group, F(1, 76) = 16.78, p < 001, ηp2 = 
.181, with older children reporting more than younger, but also an effect of Recall Order, 
F(1, 76) = 3.97, p = .05, ηp2 = .05, with children in the Breadth-first condition making 
more discriminatory references overall than children in the Depth-first condition.  There 
was no main effect of Discriminatory references, F(1, 76) = 3.00, p = .087, ηp2 = .038, 
but the variable interacted with both Age Group and Recall Order, Fs ≥ 4.07, ps < .05, 
ηp2s ≤ .051, and the three-way interaction among them was significant, F(1, 76) = 9.27, p 
= .003, ηp2 = .109.  A 2(Recall Order) x 2(Discriminatory references) ANOVA yielded no 
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significant effects for the younger children who averaged .28 (SD = .51) discriminations 
per interview, Fs ≤ 1.98, ps = ns, ηp2s = .05.  For older children, the main effect of phase 
was marginal, F(1, 38) = 3.81, p = .058, ηp2 = .091, and Recall Order nonsignificant, F(1, 
38) = 2.64, p = ns, ηp2 = .065, but the interaction was significant, F(1, 38) = 8.37, p = 
.006,  ηp2 = .181.  Follow-up paired samples t-tests for each condition (alpha = .025) 
confirmed that older children reported significantly more discriminatory references in the 
Breadth (M = 2.60, SD =2.64) than the Depth Phase (M = .80, SD = 1.44) if they received 
Breadth prompts first, t(19) = 3.04, p = .007, Cohen’s d = .85.  If they received Depth 
prompts first, discriminatory references did not differ significantly from the Breadth (M = 
.75, SD = 1.48) to Depth Phase (M = 1.10, SD = 1.83), t(19) < 1, p = ns, Cohen’s d = .21.   
Source Accuracy. Analyses of accurate attributions can only be conducted with 
children with repeated-event experience, as it focuses on their ability to retrieve the 
particular instantiation from a set of alternatives and match it to a target occurrence.  
Many children did not spontaneously mention all three of hi, lo, and variable 
instantiation types in their free recall, and as such we could not statistically compare 
accurate attributions for the types across levels of Age Group and Recall Order.  Instead, 
to test Hypothesis 6, we computed the children’s average proportion accuracy score for 
Hi, Lo and Variable instantiations (combined) to serve as the dependent variable in a 
2(Age Group) x 2(Recall Order) ANOVA.  
The analysis demonstrated no effects of Age Group or Recall Order on source 
accuracy, Fs < 1, ps = ns, ηp2s < .01.  Cell means are provided in Table 2 for the 
interested reader, but none differed significantly.  Children’s overall proportion accurate 
was .59 (SD = .33), which is consistent with previous research (Brubacher, Roberts, & 
Powell, 2010) using the same age group and a similar version of the events, but with an 
entirely different interview protocol and different sample of children, suggesting that the 
manipulation of recall order does not impact children’s accuracy for an instance of a lab-
based repeated event.  
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Discussion 
The focus of the current research was to examine whether recalling a script in 
advance of recalling episodic information improves or interferes with the quality of 
children’s recall (amount of target information and accuracy) of an instance of a repeated 
event.  Hudson and Nelson (1986) demonstrated that recall order can affect the quantity 
of details children recall about a routine event when children engage in script versus 
episodic recall at different time points, while Fivush (1984) did not find effects of recall 
order within a single interview.  In this study, we investigated children’s memories of an 
instance of their choosing in terms of the amount and also the accuracy with which 
details were accurately attributed to individual episodes.  Specifically, we asked one 
group of children to give a generic description (i.e., their ‘script’) of the series of 
Activities, in advance of describing one occurrence; while the other group did the 
reverse.   
In line with previous research, and Hypotheses 1 - 3, we found that older children, 
those who received Breadth prompts first, and those with repeated experience, reported 
more information than did younger children, those who received Depth prompts first, and 
those with single experience, respectively.  Children who received Breadth prompts first 
reported more Items across the entire interview than children who received Depth 
prompts first, and they also reported more Instantiations but specifically within the 
Breadth Phase.  In terms of Hypothesis 4, that older children with repeated experience 
would be most affected by the manipulation of Recall Order, we did not find this to be 
the case; Recall Order had similar effects on all children.   
Hypotheses 5a, b, and c examined the style children used when reporting their 
script versus memory for a specific occurrence.  By considering the level of reporting 
specificity (Items versus Instantiations; Hypothesis 5a) we demonstrated that children did 
not simply change their verb tense to match that of the interviewer; they did in fact 
alternate between memory representations, at least to some extent.  Children of both ages 
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reported more Instantiation-level descriptions in the Depth Phase (e.g., “I wore a 
jellybean badge”) than in the Breadth Phase, and this effect was stronger for older 
children.  They reported marginally more Items in Breadth than Depth; this non-
significant trend was limited to the older children.  We infer that children understood the 
implied meaning of the two prompt-types (generic versus episodic) and attempted to 
provide descriptions that varied accordingly not just in language tense, but in their level 
of specificity.  The analyses fell short of significance for the prediction that more Item-
level descriptions would be provided in the Breadth than Depth Phase.  This was due to 
the fact that children tended to list instantiations when describing the series (e.g., “we get 
jellybean, leaf and feather badges”), rather than only extracting and reporting the higher 
order categories (e.g., “we get badges”).  This effect was especially prevalent in children 
who received Breadth prompts first.  They reported significantly more instantiations in 
the Breadth Phase than children who received Depth prompts first.  This pattern of 
reporting can be helpful in investigative interviews because it provides interviewers with 
more specific details to later question children about when probing for episodes (i.e., 
Depth).   
As predicted by Hypothesis 5b, children used a significantly greater proportion of 
episodic language in the Depth rather than the Breadth phase, and this was especially true 
for children with repeated experience (i.e., who would have an event script).  In addition, 
the analyses demonstrated that the 4- and 5-year old children with repeated experience 
used the lowest proportion of episodic language overall, demonstrating that they do have 
more difficulty than older children in moving away from their script representation.  
Interestingly, however, some children in both age groups with single event experience 
were able to provide accounts that resembled scripts in terms of language used (e.g., “you 
come in, they play games with you, give you a badge”), but only when they had engaged 
in recall of an episode first.  As this latter unpredicted and novel finding was not 
dependent on age, it supports research suggesting that younger children too can provide a 
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generic account, albeit with less detail than older children, even after only one experience 
(Fivush, 1984).  Children did not simply mimic the language used by interviewers, 
because children with single experience spoke episodically regardless of interviewer 
prompt (even the children described above who recalled an episode first still spoke 
episodically 61% of the time [SD = 36] in response to Breadth prompts, while the 
interviewers used episodic prompts only 7% of the time [SD = 12]).   
Older children were also significantly more likely when delivering their scripts to 
make comparisons across occurrences, than when describing an episode (Hypothesis 5c). 
Younger children, who may have less stable scripts, did not differ across Phase.  
Although rare, these General references were present in the Depth phase, suggesting that 
children of both ages did draw also on their script when describing an occurrence.  
Additionally, the older children were likely to make more contrasts among occurrences 
(discriminatory references) when providing their script, but only when they were asked 
for their script first.  If children are able to contrast instances of repeated events at the 
outset of an interview, they may provide investigators with unique details (specifying one 
particular time) which can be especially helpful for subsequently obtaining accounts of 
individual incidents.  These data suggest that allowing children to engage in script recall 
before describing individual episodes may actually prove useful to investigative 
interviewing, at least for older children, although it is far too soon to extrapolate this 
research conducted in the lab to procedures used in the field.    
Taken in their entirety, the current study generated novel findings about memory 
organization, detail, and source attribution under controlled conditions.  Our data support 
predictions made by script theories, and extend the theory in two ways: 1) that although 
younger children and children with single-event experience consistently reported fewer 
details, they do appear to be affected by the recall order manipulation in somewhat the 
same manner as older children and those with repeated experience as evidenced by the 
lack of interactions with Recall Order in the amount of information reported; and 2) to 
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demonstrate that recalling a script first does not lead to greater confusion of slot 
alternatives when recalling a specific incident than the reverse order.  It should be noted, 
however, that explicit predictions about accurate attributions of details are not made by 
script theories.  
Fuzzy-trace theory suggests that, after a delay, rehearsal of the gist trace should 
promote increased decay of verbatim traces, and so, describing “what usually happens” 
first should subsequently result in greater confusion of the specific instantiations across 
occurrences because the individual traces for each occurrence of the Activities have 
weakened. Yet we found no Age Group or Recall Order differences in ability to attribute 
an instantiation to the nominated target occurrence. While contradictory to our 
predictions, there are a number of factors to consider given that there were several 
innovative aspects in the study design.  
Fuzzy-trace theory has historically been applied to simpler memory material (e.g., 
DRM lists; Carniero, Albuquerque, Fernandez, & Estevez, 2007), rather than the more 
participatory activities here (though note Odegard, Cooper, Lampinen, Reyna, & 
Brainerd’s [2009] study on thematic memory).  It is possible that, after engagement in 
complex, interactive situations, rehearsal of the gist or script brings to mind many of the 
possible alternatives (instantiations).  Although children may still choose the wrong 
verbatim trace, recalling the series of activities may provide more alternatives to choose 
from, and thus actually increases the likelihood that the correct trace is among the 
produced alternatives.   
Second, verbatim and gist traces may still have existed in parallel at the interview 
session leaving both accessible and independent, but this reasoning is unlikely since 
statistical dependence and association between the traces can occur within a few days of 
encoding (Brainerd & Reyna, 2004).  In contrast, it is highly plausible that verbatim 
traces were weak in all children at the time of the interview (five to seven days after the 
last event).  If the traces had already decayed, recall order could not be expected to have 
Running head: RETRIEVAL OF EPISODIC VERSUS GENERIC INFORMATION   30 
 
any effect on source accuracy.  Under these circumstances, how can we ever expect 
accurate recounts of specific instances?   
The source-monitoring framework is the only one of the three theories to explain 
how accurate reconstruction can take place.  Although the source-monitoring framework 
predicts improved source accuracy for older compared to younger children, it also 
suggests that highly similar events will be very difficult to distinguish for everyone, 
including adults.  The oldest children in the current study are just beginning to reach 
mature levels of source discrimination (Roberts, 2002), and may not have been able to 
discriminate the events.       
Implications 
A common-sense notion exists that children who have multiple experiences with 
an event should be asked about one instance first to prevent confusion amongst instances 
and, indeed, investigative interviewers must often do so to secure a single account (Lamb, 
Sternberg, & Esplin, 1995).  For example, in many jurisdictions, children who testify 
about an abusive event must elaborate on one instance with a relative amount of precision 
so that a charge can be laid (Guadagno et al., 2006). It sometimes occurs, however, that 
interviewers allow children to give a generic account first given that it is easier for 
children to do this (see Guadagno & Powell, 2009).  Until now, the impact of this 
practice has not been evaluated.  The results of this study suggest that asking what 
usually happens first may not be as detrimental to children’s testimony as previously 
thought, and may in fact assist children in retrieving more information.  It should be 
noted, however, that children in the current study were interviewed using the most 
optimal procedures (e.g., open-ended, non-suggestive questions).  The findings of this 
experiment may not generalize to situations in which children have been misled (e.g., 
Powell, Roberts, & Thomson, 2000), or are only directly asked for specific pieces of 
information rather than spontaneous reports.   
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The results also suggest a degree of flexibility with which children can switch 
between representations of individual occurrences and the general event representation, 
which involve different types of representational processes, memory storage, and 
retrieval mechanisms (Hudson & Nelson, 1986).  Although many more questions remain, 
the current research is a valuable and unique contribution to the growing body of research 
on children’s memories for instances of repeated events because these data are the first to 
provide an in-depth picture of the effects of recall order not only on the amount of details 
reported and their level of specificity, but also on children’s attributions of those details 
to specific episodes, which were not diminished by accessing scripts prior to episodic 
information.      
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Footnote 
1     Detailed analyses concerning the frequency with which children with repeated 
experience reported the various detail-types are not expanded upon in the current paper 
because we did not make explicit predictions with respect to these variables, and children 
did not differ in their reporting patterns as a function of Recall Order or Phase, Fs ≤ 2.45, 
ps = ns, ηp2s ≤ .031.  Children reported variable and hi/lo details significantly more often 
than fixed details, the former not differing, Fs ≥ 3.61, ps ≤ .035, ηp2s ≥ .045.  More 
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Table 1 
Proportion of episodic language used in Breadth and Depth phases 
   Recall Order 
Age Frequency Phase Breadth-first  Depth-first  
 
4- and 5-year olds 
1 time Breadth .65 (.27) .41 (.34) 
 Depth .97 (.05) .98 (.05) 
4 times Breadth .14 (.19) . 25 (.33) 
 Depth .68 (.23) .75 (.23) 
 
7- and 8-year olds 
1 time Breadth .77 (.22) .61 (.36) 
 Depth .98 (.07) .99 (.02) 
4 times Breadth .22 (.23) .26 (.36) 
 Depth .89 (.17) .82 (.23) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 




Proportion of Accurate Source Attributions by Children with Repeated Event Experience, 
by Age Group and Recall Order 
 Recall Order 
Age Breadth-first  Depth-first  
4- and 5-year olds .62 (.38) .58 (.41) 
7- and 8-year olds .61 (.26) .57 (.30) 
Note: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 













































































































































Figure 2. Three-way interaction among Age Group x Event Frequency x Phase on 

















































Note: Means represented by different lower-case letters, within each Phase, differ 
significantly.  



























































Figure 3. Three-way interaction among Recall Order x Event Frequency x Phase on 







Note: Means represented by different lower-case letters, within each Phase, differ significantly. 
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